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‘There Was A Third Man . . . ’: Tales from a Global Policy
Consultation on Indicators for the Sustainable
Development Goals
Deval Desai and Mareike Schomerus
ABSTRACT
This article reflects on the experience of the two authors as ‘experts’ during
consultations on justice and security indicators for the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. The authors examine how the tension between the indeterminacy
of the concepts to be measured — justice and security — and the concrete-
ness of indicators shaped the politics of the consultations. Participants used
this tension strategically to destabilize notions of time, space and identity on
which knowledge production rests. In doing so, they blurred the distinction
between academics, advocates and policy makers. They did this to lay claim
to some aspects of implementation while distancing themselves from oth-
ers. The authors then juxtapose this with personal experience of researching
South Sudanese citizens, who challenged and deconstructed that distinction.
At the same time, experts at the consultations incorporated an image of these
citizens as an ethical justification for the discussion. The authors argue that a
more complex sociology of knowledge is required to understand how these
global knowledge practices work from the global to the local. Such a sociol-
ogy of knowledge acknowledges fluidity and grapples with how knowledge
practices defer and delimitmoments of decision; it requires an ethico-political
— rather than just a political — critique.
INTRODUCTION: ‘VIENNA IS A CLOSED CITY . . . ’1
In the opening scene of OrsonWelles’ 1949movie The ThirdMan, a narrator
speaks over images of post-war Vienna. He explains that the city has been
The authors would like to thank Benedict Kingsbury, Sally Engle Merry, Kevin Davis, Sebastian
von Einsiedel and the participants at the UNU/NYU workshop on Measurement and Data in
the Governance of Illicit Activities (17–18 November 2014), for the invitation to attend and for
their comments. We would also like to thank Peter Chapman, Amy Cohen, Julia Dehm, Todd
Foglesong, Morten Jerven, David Kennedy, Andrew Lang, Rebecca Tapscott, Michael Watts
and the anonymous reviewers of Development and Change for comments on various drafts of
the paper. Errors and omissions remain our own.
1. From The Third Man (Greene and Reed, 1969: 91).
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divided among four occupying powers — the USA, UK, Russia and France
— and adds: ‘But the centre of the city, that’s international, policed by
an International Patrol . . . one member of each of the four powers. What
a hope they had, all strangers to the place and none of them could speak
the same language’ (Greene and Reed, 1969: 12). In today’s Vienna, the
centre of the city has been reclaimed, Austrian to its cafe´ core. Yet a little
further out, a weighty complex of grey, crescent-shaped UN office buildings
remains an international island. We were invited to these curved enclaves of
international technocracy in 2013, along with 20 or so ‘experts’ in security
and justice, to develop indicators for the post-2015Agenda, otherwise known
as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
We too were all strangers to the place, invited as representatives of three
different powers: the republics of Academia, Policy Making and Advocacy.
We nominally spoke our national languages: academic Critique, policy Prag-
matism and advocacy’s Normativity. We had been invited to police an in-
ternational zone — in our case not Vienna, but the world. But rather than
sending forces, indicators would be our tools of discipline and order. By
developing indicators for the SDGs, we would dictate what was to count as
legitimate development and thus influence where and how aid would flow.
There had been an earlier international development policing operation
just 15 years previously. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set
a series of highly visible targets for the period between 2000 and 2015, such
as halving the proportion of people living on less than US$ 1.25 a day, or
reducing by three-quarters the proportion ofwomen dying in childbirth (Berg
and Desai, 2013; Fukuda-Parr and Yamin, 2013). The MDGs had little truck
with harder-to-measure issues like security and justice. This time around,
though, we had an opportunity to fight on the front lines. Security and justice
were in the running to be named in one of the SDGs. The participants in our
meeting had been invited by a UN agency — one of dozens with a mandate
to work on security and justice — to help develop a comprehensive set of
targets and indicators for those two sectors that the agency could propose
for incorporation into the SDGs.
Our role on the front lines was not exactly clear.2 We knew that what
we would produce in Vienna could in some way feed into our hosts’ take
on security and justice indicators. In doing so, we might influence the many
otherUN agencies that were suiting up and getting ready to patrol, andmaybe
even eventually contribute an official way to measure an SDG centred on
justice and security.3 But exactly what that SDG might look like remained
a mystery. Whose justice, security from what? At best, we had a rough idea
2. We got a hint of our hosts’ ambitions from the invitation. They talked of their significant
experience in security and justice work since the 1990s. They recognized that this work was
not the preserve of a single agency and hoped to use the consultations to influence — or
even set the SDG agenda for — the 40 or more UN agencies working on these issues.
3. This was to become SDG 16 on peace and justice.
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from the report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015
Development Agenda, which suggested a policing beat that would ‘ensure
good governance and effective institutions’, and ‘ensure stable and peaceful
societies’ (UN, 2013).
And so three powers arrived inVienna, speaking three different languages,
patrolling a beat whose borders we did not know and which were of someone
else’s making. What hope did we have of ‘policing’ the world on its way
to justice and security? Given that our home country, Academia, offered
the refuge of scholarly detachment, we thought we would go to Vienna and
find out. For both of us, it was an opportunity to participate in and analyse
a process of knowledge production in the service of global governance.
Here is how we thought it would work: each participant would do his duty.
Advocates would offer and defend aspirational norms, academics would
offer sceptical critiques, and policy makers would sketch out pragmatic
ways forward. Indicators would be a product of the political skirmishes
among these three groups. We would play our role, and at the same time be
the ethnographer-cum-critic of global governmentality, ready to narrate the
process and its characters afterwards.4
In two days of consultations, we seemed to all agree that it was important
to include security and justice on the SDG agenda. We considered dozens
of possible indicators, from the number of police per 100,000 people, to the
number of human rights instruments ratified. But while talking through these
possibilities, participants rehearsed a familiar set of agonies about knowledge
practices and measurement. We discussed the potential and limitations of
balancing the local and the global, of scepticism and normative aspiration, of
unintended consequences and discipline. And in the end, we had not defined
indicators for just and secure societies; the outcome document was simply
a revised version of the invitation note. A few months later, several of the
participants reconvened in New York City to consult on the same stuff all
over again, at the behest of yet another UN agency seeking to mobilize its
own patrol (and showing little interest in the document from the Vienna
consultation).5
With its prescribed roles and well-rehearsed arguments, the consultation
process in Vienna seemed very familiar to us. Yet at the same time it was
4. We both share an appreciation of stories of global governance that grapple with how the
arena of expert engagement is structured. Of particular interest here have been processes
of developing the notion of a stable area of expertise which then allows participation and
consultation along a defined field of engagement: see Deeb and Marcus (2011); Johns
(2016); Lewis and Mosse (2006a, 2006b); Olivier de Sardan (2005); Riles (2001, 2011).
5. We only learned about the plans for the subsequent New York meeting in Vienna. Nor did
we know in advance that there was not going to be a distinct outcome document. At the
time, we— just like ethnographers of meetings— presumed that, whatever the outcome, the
consultation would be bounded, discrete and be ‘recognized’ through an outcome document
that bore some (or no) relation to the discussions. See, for example, Riles (2006); Strathern
(2003).
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deeply confusing. The roles and national languages of each occupying force
were not as clearly demarcated as we had expected. Positions and arguments
were fluid, not stable. Advocates, academics and policy makers swapped
uniforms at will and created an ever-evolving pidgin. Such tactics cut off
our retreat to academic remove: we had nowhere to stand to observe what
was going on, and no way of telling who was friend or foe.
We came to realize that these consultations were not really a technical
or political exercise about governing the world. Rather, we were witnessing
a contest over the economy of implementation of knowledge practices —
people staking out a position so that at some point in the future they might
get money to develop statistical capacity, build research budgets and so
on. The contours of this contest were determined by the emptiness of the
underlying concepts of security and justice. Each side could easily deploy
well-rehearsed arguments in each other’s languages — a ‘context matters!’
here, a ‘there’s no political will for that’ there — to divvy up future spoils.
It was money for old trope.
In this article, we reflect on what we saw and did in Vienna as an ethno-
graphic contribution to the sociology of knowledge in global governance.
We argue that this sociology generally seeks to reveal the hidden politics
of global governance and, to do so, assumes to its detriment the stable divi-
sion of ‘knowledge work’ (Blackler, 1995) between academia, policy mak-
ing and advocacy. This division may well enable academics to contribute
to policy processes while critiquing their politics. A movement between
engagement and critical detachment is part of the academic’s role in the
process, resting on a contextual and sceptical orientation that constitutes
her lot.
Yet we argue that this stable division of knowledgework is bothmisguided
and has unintended effects. These clear distinctions between roles function
as a framework through which participants in consultations like Vienna
can allocate blame whenever things go wrong. They might rail against the
dominance of advocates over academics, or express resentment at constant
demands to be pragmatic rather than normative. In general, they can frame
the process as one in which the deck is always already stacked in favour of
one group over the others (Lewis and Mosse, 2006b; Li, 2007b).
We suggest a different approach. Rather than analysing consultations
about indeterminate concepts like security and justice in terms of the po-
litical contests between already-constituted groups, we approach Vienna —
and consultation processes more broadly — as an exercise in deferring the
time and place of policy decisions. In so doing, these consultations produce
an economy of policy implementation. In the act of deferring, participants
collapsed a structural understanding of knowledge production. Instead, con-
sultations focused our attention on individual moments of decision within
the process of implementation, along with participants’ own potential future
role in taking those decisions. This future role could be played on behalf of
whoever ended up holding the implementation purse strings, including the
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agency that had brought us together. This, we suggest, means that we need
an ethical critique of the specific expert and her position in the chains of
decision making that constitute policy, rather than a critique of her generic
role.
We begin with method. In order to bring forth our experience of fluidity
in the consultation, we write using disruption of identity, time and space.
Next, we turn to the literature to which we are contributing— on knowledge
production at the global level in the service of global governance. We point
to the presumption of a stable division of labour (to be upheld in the breach
as in the observance, to be sure) between academia, policy making and
advocacy. We experienced this division as a fluid performance rather than a
concrete edifice. We then map the source of this fluidity in our story, finding
it in the relationship between the indeterminacy of security and justice and
the concreteness of the indicator as a knowledge artefact.
We go on to sketch our experiences at the consultations and how they
revealed global governance to us as the politics and performance of mun-
dane measurement. Mareike then juxtaposes Vienna with her experience
as a researcher in South Sudan. The people she researched — we think
of those on the receiving end of the SDGs as the fourth occupying force
in, but absent from, Vienna — spoke yet another language, one that did
not care about our distinctions between academics, policy makers and ad-
vocates. The South Sudanese just wanted to know what we were saying
about them, and what was in it for them. Yet the division of labour in
Vienna was such that this fourth force was conjured up as a resource by
the other three forces, justifying all kinds of arguments. The absence of
the fourth force in any concrete fashion seemed to show global governance
in all its irrelevance, revealed again in the politics and performance of
measurement.
So we keep returning to The Third Man, a tale of intrigue, betrayal and
disguised profit. The film’s antagonist is Harry Lime, a black marketeer who
dilutes, adulterates and sells penicillin that kills many. Unaware of Harry’s
doings, his old (and now broke) childhood friend Holly Martins, a writer,
comes to Vienna. Lime has offered him ‘some sort of a job’ there, and
Martins takes the bone he has been thrown — only to find that their old
relationship has changed beyond recognition. Indeed, when Holly arrives,
Lime is presumed dead, only to reappear. At the film’s climactic moment,
having found out the awful truth about Lime’s work, Martins hesitates to
shoot Lime when he has him in his sights. To the last, he struggles to
judge his amoral erstwhile friend. He is flummoxed by their shared past, the
finality of pulling the trigger, and the moral casuistry on display everywhere
in Vienna. Against a backdrop of shifting relationships, shadowy figures
and hidden governance in Vienna — a place where things are not what they
seem— the audience is put in Martins’ place, dared to judge Lime profiting
from a system that allows him to sell medicine to those in need, no matter
the quality and the consequences.
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A NOTE ONMETHODS: ‘I’VE NEVER KEPT YOU OUT OF ANYTHING . . .
YET’6
After the discussions, we both left Vienna with a sense of rupture about
who we were and what we were doing there. We examine this rupture
here, exploring our imaginations of people’s roles (including our own),
and how they were washed away in the fluidity of the consultations. We
argue that this fluidity is more than just the unstable oscillation between the
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that marks the challenge of writing ethnographically
about policy (Shore et al., 2011). Those who write about such oscillations
suggest that the insider nature of the expert consultation challenges one’s
sense of outside academic remove and critical orientation. By contrast, our
experience in Vienna suggested that the effort required to maintain the role
of the sceptical academic was an intrinsic part of the functioning of the
consultations themselves. That effort contributed to the production of the
role of the academic and its subsequent mobilization by participants. The
role was then transcended and destabilized as part of the overall struggle
over the political economy of implementation.
From what stable vantage point can we write about a fluid process?
The sort of reflexive writing we want to undertake frequently entails re-
inforcement — rather than rupture — of the roles we are examining. For
example, in this article, we perform the authorial role of academics speak-
ing an academic language. So we opt to write ‘infrareflexively’ (Latour,
1988; Leydesdorff, 2006: 148–49), employing style and motif to help us
turn our disjointed, uncanny feelings about the consultations into academic
prose.7
We anchor our reflections in unstable scripts about ourselves, a product
of our fuzzy memory of who we were during the consultations. Deval artic-
ulates himself as a sometime lawyer, sometime policy professional, some-
time academic, and oft-time professional sceptic. For him, global indicators
for something as complex as justice and security represented a fascinating
challenge to world builders trying to balance aspirational sentiment, po-
litical sophistication and technocratic competence.8 Mareike’s view of the
world has been shaped by her journalistic and ethnographic attempts to deci-
pher complexity through the experience of the individual, probably seeking
6. Greene and Reed (1969: 97).
7. See Latour (1988); we share Latour’s emphasis on style as a means of escaping the infinite
regress of positionality in a reflexive project such as this (Lewis and Mosse, 2006b: 8), but
perhaps not quite so defensively.
8. Our use of free indirect speech to narrate ourselves and much of the activity in Vienna is
intended to reflect the tension in indicator production between what appears to be true and
what has the quality of truth — the fundamentally modern tension between verisimilitude
and verity. See Jameson (2013: 37): ‘If it means something, it can’t be real; if it is real, it
can’t be absorbed by purely mental or conceptual categories’.
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something genuine in the process (albeit with the self-awareness that comes
as standard with the toolkit of the thoughtful qualitative researcher). She
felt that bird’s-eye-view measurement tools do not capture individuality, but
as a pragmatist and generally nosy person she was keen to see how this
conversation would go. We did not know each other all that well before the
consultations, and we certainly did not go with a shared agenda to reflect
and write. The idea emerged much later as we tried to make sense of our
experience in Vienna (and subsequent consultations on the SDGs in which
we participated).
Stylistically, we portray Vienna in the fourth person and in an analytic,
impressionistic and sketchy fashion. Quotes we provide from the consulta-
tions are stylized to present our point, but rooted in our memory and notes
of discussions at the consultation. We contrast this with a picture of South
Sudan, co-written but in Mareike’s voice, providing a sort of ethnographic
narrativewith direct quotes fromfield research.9 Our stylemeanders between
ethnographic, journalistic, phenomenological and analytic.
Thematically, we juxtapose recurring motifs to reflect axes of space, time
and identity, since it was along these three axes that we felt rupture (Ash-
more, 1989; David Kennedy, 1984, 1993). The ways in which we destabilize
space are most obvious. We write from the generic ‘global’ about Vienna
and South Sudan, along with the intersections of the three spaces. Time
is no longer linear: in our retelling we combine or juxtapose moments in
Vienna with backstories of ourselves, experiences in South Sudan from an
undefined and frozen moment of field research, a textual ‘now’ in which
we write, and a future defined by the extent to which measurable goals
are achieved. Reflecting how confusing this was to us and our own iden-
tities, we shift between the first, third and fourth person, producing our-
selves within the text alongside scenes, dialogue and omniscient narration
from a film set in post-war Vienna about a writer and a casuist. Anchor-
ing our experience in The Third Man echoes the insights of those who
argue that film and literature can represent the complexity of development
processes in ways that analytical writing cannot.10 Holly Martins’ moment
of hesitation is a case in point. We produce this piece as a conversation
(Rorty, 1979), mirroring the open-endedness and fluidity of our experience
in Vienna.
9. This reflects the challenges of thick description of a transnational ‘centre’ that defines itself
by its resistance to being unveiled and contextualized — rather, being the space of global
analysis — and at the same time this ‘centre’s’ construction of a ‘periphery’ from where
descriptive context emerges to inform that analysis (Deeb and Marcus, 2011; Riles, 2001).
10. Lewis et al. (2008, 2013, 2014) have famously sought to broaden the aesthetic imagination
of development scholars by exhorting them to (inter alia) read Dickens and watch Slumdog
Millionaire. Our take is more stylistic, leveraging film’s power of disjointed representation
into our methodological strategy (see Poole, 2005).
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION: ‘GOOD FELLOWS, ON
THEWHOLE’11
Neither of us went to Vienna with a clear sense of mission. We had both
been engaged with the post-2015 process from a variety of perspectives,
including programming, policy and academic research (but not advocacy).
Vienna appeared to be an opportunity to concretize our sceptical thinking
about the SDGs — for example, how they might be decontextual, apolitical
and misallocate aid. Before leaving, we speculated about the other attendees.
We — given our profiles — clearly filled the role of ‘academic sceptics’.
But the other participants? The organizers had not provided bios and furtive
googling of names gave fewhints.Whatever role theywere to play inVienna,
many could credibly be described as some mix of academic, policy maker
and/or advocate.
This is, of course, not unusual. Sociologists of knowledge in global gov-
ernance have often grappled with how deeply intertwined policy making
and academia are. Some fear it. Goldman (2006) and Rottenburg (2009) see
this imbrication as submitting critical thought to the imperatives of (neo-
liberal) global governmentality and to the related logics and ideologies
of development institutions. They lament researchers who are hired as ad
hoc consultants to produce weak justificatory scholarship for development
projects, and the suppression of any critical findings they might produce.12
Li is more ambivalent. She suggests academics must get to know the back-
ground processes and practices of global governance, which might entail
direct participation in governance processes at the same time as produc-
ing ethnographies of them (Li, 2007a, 2007b).13 Roy (2010) is even more
positive. Discussing microfinance initiatives, she views thoughtful policy
makers and project leaders at the World Bank as potential ‘double agents’
who carry academic critiques to the heart of power. All, however, under-
stand this imbrication to be the playing of different roles at different times,
as appropriate. The roles may be strategized, but their logics and functions
remain discrete.
Like these studies of development projects and programmes, sociological
or ethnographic studies of indicators in global governance also presume
that different and discrete roles exist. These studies seek to explain how
indicators emerge from their contested processes of production as seemingly
11. Greene and Reed (1969: 12).
12. Rather than indicators, these two authors focus on the relationship between academia and
development projects (a dam in Laos for Goldman and a fictionalized waterworks improve-
ment project for Rottenburg).
13. Bueger and Mireanu (2014: 119) are even more positive about a praxis turn. Drawing
heavily on Latour, they argue for ‘an instrumental understanding of academic practice as
productive of social change and innovation’, thereby requiring a ‘proximity’ to centres of
power, albeit without Li’s ambivalent sensibility regarding the importance of understanding
those centres, and the potential enrolment that entails.
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authoritative, neutral and technical artefacts. In doing so, they try to recover
the core of the contested politics of the thing being indicated, be it who
counts as a terrorist or what counts as labour flexibility (Gabay, 2011; Johns,
2016; Santos, 2009; Uruen˜a, 2015). The supposed neutrality of the indicator
rests on the expertise that underpins indicator production, which in turn rests
on experts playing specialized roles that entail their own particular language
— and even costumes or outfits.14
One might expect, then, a division of expert labour between advocacy,
academic and policy ‘tribes’ (Leijonhufvud, 1973) around the table in Vi-
enna, irrespective of the participants’ backgrounds or identities.15 Lewis and
Mosse’s analysis (2006b: 5–7, drawing on Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003)
suggests that this division of labour goes beyond identity: for them, these
tribes adopt logics of ‘hope’ (advocates), ‘critical reflection’ (academics) and
‘administrative politics’ (policy makers). We had supposed that in Vienna
there would be what Lewis and Mosse (2006b: 5) describe as ‘an inevitable
disjuncture’ between these logics. They would be clear, distinct, separate
and stable: the three tribes would come from such ‘different locations’ that
‘it [would] not always [be] possible to translate between them’, as Lewis
and Mosse (ibid.: 6) put it.
Yet we also shared Lewis and Mosse’s (ibid.) cautious but optimistic
tone about the possibilities in our bringing the logic of critical reflection to
the process. We presumed that advocates would mobilize counsels of hope
and despair, tales of pain and possibility. They would simplify the world
into normative challenges, and offer normative solutions. Despite the plural
nature of our experience, we as academics would be called upon to raise
critical eyebrows to their pleas, apply contextual knowledge, identify dilem-
mas, and thereby lend complexity and credibility to the process. That same
critical orientation would also enable us to step back after the fact, uncov-
ering and recounting the politics of the process. In between the advocate
and the academic, cool-headed policy makers would hammer out indicators
on the anvils of pragmatism. They would mediate complexity and simplic-
ity by settling on indicators that appeared to assert universal knowledge —
although everyone around the table would understand them to be heuristic
devices, so that if and whenever the indicators proved problematic we could
unveil their hidden politics in our subsequent writing in our tribal language.
We stylize the roles and functions of participants in global knowledge
practices from the perspective of Lewis, Mosse, Li and others in Figure 1.
We break the roles down into logics, or how participants are supposed
to think about questions in general; approaches, or how they think about
14. See Rajah (2015) and Uribe (2015: 137) for a discussion of the ties and suits that mark
out savvy and disembedded global technocrats from advocates and everyone else at World
Justice Project ‘outreach meetings’. See also Hu¨sken (2006).
15. See Olivier de Sardan (2005) who is deeply invested in the distinction between academia
and policy as modes of identity.
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Figure 1. The Orthodox Sociology of Knowledge of Global Knowledge
Practices
specific questions; and tactics, or how they frame and articulate their re-
sponses to specific questions. As participants introduced themselves in Vi-
enna, presenting their institutional affiliation and reason for being in the
room, they fell into one of the three roles presented in Figure 1. Yet what
unfolded quickly left our neat categorizations behind. While the logics ap-
peared — or at least sentences that sounded like they were drawing on them
— roles, approaches and tactics blended, transformed and separated again
at different times. In the absence of a clear notion from the organizers about
our potential impact, we were left playing a game whose stakes were un-
clear and whose rules were constantly changing. To explore how roles and
contributions transmuted and moved, we begin with the concrete knowledge
artefact we were engaged in producing: the indicator of justice and security.
INDICATORS AS KNOWLEDGE ARTEFACTS: ‘WE SHOULD HAVE DUG
DEEPER THAN A GRAVE’16
Indicators govern. They are not a mere reflection of reality — as knowledge
practices, indicators participate in the production of reality. This notion
has become axiomatic in the literature on global governance. Most writers
seem anxious about two things: how indicators govern, and what happens
when they govern. Alongside functionalist critiques of the adequacy and
effectiveness of neat numbers, some writers are concerned with the magic
of quantification and its disciplinary power. The indicator is analysed as a
stable and capacious cipher for some form of neoliberal ideology or govern-
mentality (see Davis et al., 2012; Krever, 2013). Some see the indicator as an
exemplar of knowledge practices that express thewill to submit to hegemonic
global rule (Davis et al., 2012; Foucault, 2010; Porter, 1995); as legitimizing
a particular form of subject/object relationship that is mediated by scientific
knowledge (Latour, 2004); or as the blending of map (measurement) and
terrain (reality) (Riles, 2001).
16. Greene and Reed (1969: 87).
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These various critiques of indicators were not far from our minds as we
settled into our seats — and roles — around the table in Vienna, even as we
proposed tracking the existence of legislation on violence against women, or
the percentage of the population that expressed confidence in the judiciary.
Indeed, over coffee, dinner or ice cream many participants aired their ap-
prehension about indicators’ limitations, in knowing, exasperated or cynical
forms.17 We remember hearing (or perhaps we even said ourselves): ‘Every-
body wants to count something! Why? How much relevance do these have
to all of the different contexts in which they are going to have to operate?
What about the unintended consequences of trying to count things?’. Offer-
ing supposedly alienating critiques of indicators as over-determined knowl-
edge products made for a comfortable, and probably quite well-rehearsed,
performance. In fields with a clear terrain of argumentation, indicators of-
fer a vernacular to spell out stylized and role-appropriate positions with
respect to knowledge practices: the academic critic (‘Context!’), the norma-
tive advocate (‘Why are you so obsessed with counting? We need to right
wrongs!’), the ‘But-what-do-we-do-on-Monday-morning’ practitioner, and
so on (Bourdieu, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1990; Dezalay and Garth, 1996; Duncan
Kennedy, 1991). We were a group of sophisticated role players, quick to
internalize critiques and deploy them to further our position.
So if roles and arguments were so clear, how was it that we emerged
confused? We point to the long history of justice and security as contested
concepts in global policy. Justice and security have been described as a
series of ‘hooray[s] for our side’ (Waldron, 2002: 139), or as ‘a shorthand
description of the positive aspects of any given political [or legal] system’
(Bingham, 2011: 5). Rather than grapple with the contestability of the con-
cepts (Desai, 2014), we all adopted contestability as a strategy to promote
our own goals, undermining unappealing suggestions with refrains such as:
‘But what do we really mean by the rule of law? Can security even be mea-
sured? Do we mean people, states or streets should be safer? Isn’t it weird
that we are all around a table trying to come up with indicators for these
messy things?’. Unlike other rehearsed arguments in the debate, which take
aim at indicators as over-determined knowledge products, the arguments in
Vienna challenged the very possibility of filling the concepts of justice and
security with meaning in any form (indicator or otherwise). All it took was
a well-placed appeal to relativism to remind us that the underlying concept
was empty. We were able to debate a vacant abstraction and its inadequate
measurement, rather than trying to hold an indicator stable through ongoing
knowledge work and the authority of expertise.18
17. On reflexivity as a self-conscious marker of vanguardism or sophistication in a field (here,
academia itself), see Wacquant and Bourdieu (1989).
18. Arguments in the literature about over-determined indicators suggest that they can be mark-
ers of chastened world-ruling ambitions — existing despite the full knowledge of their
inadequacy which does not deter from allowing them to become the basis for ‘actionability’
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Instead, we divided the world into an inside and an outside, a just and
unjust, a secure and insecure. We could place the dividing line anywhere, as
in the following exchange:
X: Road deaths are a serious killer in most developing countries. And how can a country
be secure when so many of its population are dying? We should have an indicator on the
number of road deaths.
Y: Women and young girls suffer also. We know that has serious development impacts. We
should also be measuring rates of femicide.
The indicator became at once concrete and arbitrary — for what is more
concrete than a number, one that indicates, even if it could just as easily
refer to road deaths as to femicide, or to the number of judges per capita as
to the length of time it takes to get a business permit?
We were not participating in the creation or reproduction of hegemonies
of knowledge/power, nor were we fighting battles to win control over the
content of the discussion or the direction of the indicator. Rather, as we argue
next, the indicator’s concrete arbitrarinessmeant that it became a placeholder
that was simultaneously a promise of instantiation as well as concrete proof
of such a promise. Around this placeholder, participants from the three tribes
were able to change positions, playing with the presumed division of labour
in the process (one that, we remind ourselves, underpins the possibility of
academic critique of such processes as that which we present here). Mixing
logics, approaches, tactics and roles allowed everyone to lay a claim to parts
of indicator implementation — the future guarantee of power and resources
in a time and place unknown.
A BOUNDARYWALTZ IN VIENNA: ‘WHAT CAN I DO? BE REASONABLE . . .
GIVE MYSELF UP? THIS IS A FAR FAR BETTER THING’19
An indicator for the SDGs should structure time (progress to a goal with
a deadline of 2030) and space (tracking progress within a polity or na-
tion state). It should emerge from contests between advocates (demanding
imminent change, globally), academic critics (calling for difficult and long-
term change that takes place in a multiplicity of spaces), and policy makers
(suggesting feasible change, attuned to the specificities of countries). When
generating indeterminate indicators of justice and security, however, we
produced unstructured time and space — malleable and never quite real.
In terms of time, we began with urgency. At the opening session and
beyond, some version of ‘now is our chance to get justice and security on
(Johns, 2016). However, ‘actionable’ was only one of several goals attached to the for-
mulation of indicators. Participants also pushed for ‘relevant’, ‘goal-oriented’, ‘end-user-
focused’, and other modifiers that suited their position. This, we suggest, points to the deeper
instability of trying to produce indicators for justice and security.
19. Greene and Reed (1969: 96).
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the global stage’ was a common refrain.20 However, any suggested indicator
for security or justice ran the risk of meaningless indeterminacy, given
the ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie, 1955) nature of the two concepts being
measured. Even if spelled out in some form of UN document, achieving
what the indicator suggested could be deferred endlessly — indeed beyond
the expiry of the SDGs in 2030 and the subsequent process to design the next
iteration (as happened with some of the MDGs). Since there was no real link
between the indicators and an overarching concept of security or justice, the
problem of measurement could be conjured up at any point, and the act of
determining the meaning or content of the indicators could be kicked down
the road. This meant that indicators could be reviewed — and reworked
and even rejected — at any moment during the SDGs’ implementation,
and by any development actor. ‘Can justice and security even be turned
into an indicator?’ was thus an equally common refrain within the group.
The answer, both from the convenors and some participants, was to think
of the consultations as a useful exercise, and to bracket bigger questions
with the promise of further ‘technical work’ at an undetermined moment
in the future in order to resolve them (Latour and Woolgar, 1986). Our
proposed indicators thus continued shifting between urgency and deferral,
in the present and the future, both ‘now’ and ‘never’.21
Our indicators were also meant to become real and instantiated in an
imagined place that arbitrarily included some spaces and displaced others.
For example, some policy makers suggested that we develop indicators for
national governance by measuring the percentage of people who had paid a
bribe to a public official in the last twelve months. This focus on national
indicators implied that data collection was to be supported through national,
state-level technical assistance, possibly side-lining other groups like local
civil society. However, advocates could just as easily focus on civil society to
collect data for the very same indicator. This would marginalize state actors
and promote networks between local and transnational civil society groups
in similarly collapsible ways. We were happy with this indeterminacy: it
kept everyone’s options open and ensured that we might insert ourselves
into that unstructured future in the way that would suit us best.
The participants’ process of producing this imagined time and space set
the stage for the collapse of the three traditional roles we had expected.
Whether we were talking about the number of judges per capita, the level of
20. The organizers had facilitated a shared basis for the initial conversations, drawing on the
report of the High-level Panel that outlined what a future set of development goals might
look like (UN, 2013).
21. This clearly resonates with Benjamin’s notion of ‘homogenous, empty time’ on which
development seeks to inscribe a vision of the future (Kelly, 1998). Development practitioners
produce this future through ‘project time’, which exists between a linear progression of
development-as-accelerated-modernization, and the repeated, three-to-five year temporal
cycles of projects (Craig and Porter, 1997). However, rather than produce ordered time, our
indicators flirted with ideas of progress in order to keep time ‘empty’ — for now.
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trust in a court, or the number of deaths in prison, we found that discussions
clustered around three different types of claim over the process of indicator
implementation. These draw on and decompose the notion of translation
in Latour (1993: 10–14). They were, first, people who wanted to generate
knowledge about the world; second, people who wanted to translate said
knowledge into a language of governing; and third, people who wanted to
transmit the governing language as part of a legitimating or authoritative
package into spaces to be governed.
Knowledge Generation
Positioning oneself as a knowledge generator requires an authoritative claim
over the credibility of one’s information, which rests on method. As ‘aca-
demics’, we thought we had that covered. Yet everyone quickly asserted
themselves as data-gathering technicians:
Getting good qualitative data in some of these places is really hard. My experience with
surveys in [country X] . . .
I spent a long time working with national statistical offices on data collection. Many have
very low capacity . . .
Our NGO produces an annual survey of violence against women. We’ve refined our survey
instrument over the last few years — we want to avoid the pitfalls of leading questions and
bias . . .
We tried on a few occasions to suggest that the politics of method — who
wins and who loses from different types of quantitative and qualitative
methodologies—might be an important concern. We were met with smiles:
this was an important point, of course, but an abstract one better suited
for the ivory tower. People were more concerned with whether country
counterparts had the technical capacity to gather data, and with asserting
that, despite their normative commitments, they wanted to produce unbiased
data and help their country counterparts do the same.
As a result, in order to enter this conversation, Deval abandoned all talk
of methodological rigour and spoke instead about his experience with the
politics of a development institution. He described his personal experience of
mobilizing fundingwithin an institution’s bureaucracy. That process, he said,
illuminated the ways in which different types of data (subjective/objective,
qualitative/quantitative) were convincing to different constituencies within
that bureaucracy (economists, project managers, country teams and so on),
depending on the way in which those constituencies chose to articulate the
problem (market failure, implementation failure, political challenges and so
forth). The time and space that the indicator was to govern thus became
a product of the relationship between a set of strategic calculations within
a development institution and the specific real-world context in which the
problemwas to be articulated— a relationship that would continually evolve
and which could continually be bracketed.
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Figure 2. Performances around Knowledge Generation
Indeed, in an inversion of usual spheres of competence— academics con-
cerned with method, policy makers concerned with interpretation of data
— we found we were well-received when we asserted that the data being
produced, irrespective of the method, could only be well understood in their
context, thereby contributing to the bracketing of the strategy/context rela-
tionship (see Schomerus, 2014). This was the easiest way for someone to
sink an indicator: layering complexity onto it until it collapsed under its
own weight. Demanding that a proposed indicator be increasingly context-
specific prevented it from fulfilling an ordering function. Instead, the indica-
tor simply became another word for data gathering. In this way, participants
strove to retain for themselves the methodological or technical competence
to gather data without specifying where and when that would take place.
In Figure 2, we stylize the role playing that we saw most frequently when
knowledge generation was raised as an issue. Academics and advocates tried
to be a little bit policy maker, policy makers tried to be a little bit academic,
and everyone did so as a means of contesting who might have the authority
to gather data in an undetermined future and a generic place.
Knowledge Translation
Knowledge translation involves claiming competence over how to interpret
data — or working out what an indicator might actually indicate. In the
opening session, everyone was exhorted to ‘measure what we treasure, not
treasure what wemeasure’. This directive established a tension between nor-
mativity and pragmatism that remained palpable throughout the workshop.
We struggled with the trade-offs between interpreting data in light of goals
and producing goals in light of available data. We saw coalitions emerge
between participants over specific matters such as child rights or gender
equality. Within these coalitions, some people adopted the role of advocates
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making a normative case. Others took on the role of pragmatic doers, often
undermining other suggested indicators with the accusation that it would be
too difficult to parse the data, that the indicator was too subjective, that it
would be politically untenable to push specific indicators through the UN
machinery, and so on. Frequently, these roles subverted the logic of the
speaker’s native tribe. On violence against women and girls, some of the
most powerful advocates emerged from the ranks of policy makers, deeply
passionate as a result of their experiences in the field. Effective pragmatic
voices surfaced from the ranks of advocates, based on their production of
detailed victimization surveys.
Hovering behind these coalitions was a tension between the relativizing
spectre of contextualized data and the generalizing exorcism of a call to ac-
tion. For example, one participant suggested an indicator on femicide. That
participant did so as an advocate, drawing on a series of micro-level stories
about the horrendous treatment of women and girls, and also as a pragmatic
policy maker, citing the availability of the necessary administrative data.
When several people around the table questioned how to meaningfully in-
terpret rates of femicide across different contexts (might this not severely
undercount the deaths of females due to the gender dimension of structural
factors such as malnutrition, for example?), a policy person defended the
indicator by adopting an advocate’s voice, reiterating the urgency of protect-
ing female lives. Another participant from an advocacy organization then
argued that the suggested indicator would likely get support in the post-
2015 process, leveraging his advocacy position to establish a powerful link
between his normative and strategic statements.
Multiple spatio-temporalities were simultaneously at play: the immediate
urgency to produce indicators that we felt in the UN’s Viennese building,
the longer-term timeline of the post-2015 process at the global level, and
the open horizon of those unknown future moments when we would have
to interpret data in some contextual setting. All that remained concrete was
people individually asserting that they knew best how to interpret data in
any and all of those different moments.
In Figure 3, we stylize the role playing that we sawmost frequently around
knowledge translation. Everybody tried to be a little bit of everything, and
everyone did so as a means of asserting their ability to deal with the tension
between normativity and pragmatism.
Figure 3. Performances around Knowledge Translation
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Knowledge Transmission
Knowledge transmitters know how to turn information into policy — for
example, informing domestic policymakers whether femicide or road deaths
(or something else entirely)matter, andwhat to do about it.When discussions
turned to the links between indicators and action, theywere explicitly framed
in terms of space and time, as in this exchange:
X: We must ensure these indicators are on issues relevant to the context of all of the Member
States.
Y: But what of the local impact? An indicator on judges per capita tells you very little about
the quality of the rule of law for large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa. It might lead to policies
that dislodge traditional justice mechanisms that are much more relevant to most people.
X: Thenmaybewe should think about how to disaggregate these indicators.We could produce
a menu of goals and baskets of indicators that could be tailored to country circumstances as
we go . . .
Y: That’s just not going to be politically feasible in the post-2015 process. We should get
real. There’s going to be one set of goals voted for by the General Assembly.
Time and space remained fluid: the UN building, the post-2015 timeline,
moments of local implementation, national data gathering, and so on. They
flowed around a concrete ‘we’. This ‘we’ existed in the meso-level times
and spaces between the indistinct international on the one hand, and concrete
implementation on the other. These were the times and spaces that would
be inhabited by anyone aspiring to be part of the work of implementing the
SDGs over the next 15 years.
This ‘we’ was narrated almost exclusively in policy-making mode, fore-
closing critical or normative discussion of implementation. Invoking ‘con-
text’ could have been a way in which the ‘we’ could have dissolved: just as
‘context’ functioned as a tool to collapse suggested data-gathering methods
and interpretations of data, asking who ‘we’ were to implement the indica-
tors could have relativized and fragmented us. Yet speaking of the ‘context’
of implementation lost its power. Rather than serving as a vehicle to critique
our unsubtle oversimplifications, evoking ‘context’ drew attention instead
to the difficulties of meso-level implementation. It encouraged participants
to suggest further interim fixes, such as baskets of indicators and menus of
goals.
As such, invoking ‘context’ functioned as a way of claiming certain types
of (meso) work while disclaiming others by turning the local into an unsolv-
able problem. In a normative register, calling on context facilitated skipping
straight to issues of global concern — that is, non-state issues of universal
importance (for example the immediate experience of young girls confronted
with early marriage). This then raised questions of the political feasibility of
the indicator given the exigencies of the post-2015 process and the need for
universal adoption by states. We could then claim the opportunity to work
on global politics and national technical capacity, while distancing ourselves
from the politically unfeasible work of local inquiries into early marriage.
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Figure 4. Performances around Knowledge Transmission
In Figure 4, we stylize the role playing that we sawmost frequently around
knowledge transmission. Everybody tried to be more of a policy maker, as
a means of ordering space and time around our role in implementation.
Implementation in Imagined Space and Time
In Vienna, we produced an imagined time and space of implementation
populated exclusively by us.Unhindered by pesky content to ideas of security
and justice, that we might have to reduce to governing technicalities or
anti-politics (Duffield, 2001; Ferguson, 1994), we could freely produce this
fluid and always-interim time and space. As a result, we performed and
transgressed the structural limitations to our roles, logics, approaches and
tactics. Indeed, the promise that these limitations existedmade ourmovement
between scepticism, pragmatism and optimism all themore effective.Having
gone beyond these limitations, all that remained were our claims that we
could generate, translate and transmit knowledge (insofar as doing so would
be valuable and would not expose us to any messy stuff). In sum, we were
data gatherers and normative pragmatists, forever occupying the meso space
of implementation and the resources that went with it.
While the indicators themselves were not necessarily depoliticizing, the
structure of this meso space did produce political effects. Systematic ques-
tions were expressed in technical terms (such as our relationship to govern-
ments being about their technical capacities, and how support might occur
through capacity building to gather data), while the political was made per-
sonal (such as howdifficult it was, conveyed through individual anecdotes, to
work with national counterparts or local NGOswhomight run surveys). This
precluded participants from attempting to talk about the power relationships
between donors, professional experts, national governments, transnational
civil society and sub-national organizations in systematic terms. And yet,
these power relationships are an important component of the implementation
of global goals and indicators.
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The critical energy of academic scepticism could not effectively challenge
this move away from power relationships and towards technical capacity.
An academic critique of systematic power needs an analytical ‘outside’; but
this ‘outside’ was always already inside and part of the debate in Vienna.
Critical thoughts were mobilized not to close the imagined meso space
but to produce it. Critique provided a tool to undermine global and local
claims — with the global emerging as over-determined and the local as
unsolvable.
Thoughts about chains of implementing relationships could only be ex-
pressed in pragmatic, policy-making terms. One participant — ostensibly an
advocate — pointed out that donors frequently set agendas by funding na-
tional statistics agencies and thereby determining what they measure. Others
quickly built on his point to suggest that national security and justice indica-
tor development processes be piloted (with funding) to help the international
community learn how to best and most effectively partner with national and
local actors.
This imagined meso space and time of implementation was not a political
space. Rather, it could best be described as an ethical space for global admin-
istrators: a space that was framed around our decisions, and around where
we would eventually build our individual roles in future implementation.
Defining the scope of implementation meant that we could claim elements
of it even as we demarcated our responsibilities, in particular whether and
how we would relate to the people we were seeking to govern (Greene and
Reed, 1969: 96).
‘HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ANYBODY’.22 PERCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION IN SOUTH SUDAN
In South Sudan’s Western Equatoria State, a group of young men, united
in their endeavour to provide physical protection from security threats to
their communities, were discussing the merits of sharing information about
their situation with me, Mareike. I duly noted down their words, translated
by a South Sudanese researcher. One topic that elicited particularly strong
responses was the frequency with which white people would stop and ask
questions about their security situation. I had a pretty good ideawho the other
outsiders had been: I knew about international military personnel (under the
UN logo, or flying the flags of Uganda, the African Union or the US) and
representatives from a prominent international advocacy group. My own
business card called me a researcher, clearly setting me apart. I did not
need to report back to command headquarters and I was comfortable in the
understanding that my work would, at best, hover in the general debate.
22. Greene and Reed (1969: 43).
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Before I left the interview, the young men challenged me:
The kind of questions the other white men asked were the same you were asking about our
lives . . . You don’t come back to tell us what has been done with this information. You are
not even putting it into a newspaper so we can confirm that is really what we said. Is this
because you are taking information only for our fun? For your money? Or because you turn
information around and write something that we have not said?23
I explained that as an academic researcher, gathering, analysing and dis-
tributing information was already a task so complex that what would happen
with the information subsequently need not — and could not — be my
concern.24 I was quickly rebuffed. ‘You have come all the way to see . . .
What is going to be your contribution after you have seen personally the
situation?’.25 A woman in a community meeting voiced her frustration with
a process that had become all-too familiar: ‘there was a team that came to us
and we expressed our challenges and there was no feedback. So now that we
expressed our challenges, what is the way forward? What are the next steps?
That team came and promised us to bring sheets of clothes and sewing ma-
chine. But there was no feedback’.26 Forget different logics, roles, identities,
locations of knowledge. If they were going to be researched, developed and
governed by those bringing ideologies, methods and questions, what was in
it for them?
Of course, this is an ancient dilemma. What should the relationship be
between the real world and what a researcher captures on paper? Myriad
political and ethical questions are caught up in the twinned crises of rep-
resentation and professional identity, all of which have been asked and
answered in many different guises. Post-colonial critics point to the Euro-
centrism of projects like mine: in their view, by purporting to carry the voice
of the South Sudanese into distant centres of perceived international power,
I produce a post-colonial cliche´ that is at best irrelevant to everyday life in
South Sudan.27 Others seek new methodological and representational strate-
gies, often involving ‘bringing research back’ to the communities under
study in more or less meaningful ways.28 In the context of my role in South
Sudan, the key question my respondents were interested in was functional,
23. Author interview, group of arrow boys in Tambura County, 20 May 2013.
24. Kapoor (2008: 42) asks the pertinent question in his discussion of post-colonial development
politics: ‘“To what extent do our depictions and actions marginalize or silence these groups
and mask our own complicities?” It is a question worth returning to when extracting
information about everyday life that is then shared amongst a small audience, or an audience
that seeks only particular types of information such that it quickly discards it’.
25. Author interview, group of arrow boys in Tambura County, 20 May 2013.
26. Author interview, community meeting in Ezo County, 6 May 2013.
27. See, generally, the contributions of Morris, Spivak, Chatterjee and Birla in Morris (2010);
for a critique specific to development research, see Raghuram and Madge (2006).
28. On the applied side, see, for example, Moreno et al. (2015); on the academic side, see, for
example, Gupta and Ferguson (1997).
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or a matter of reciprocal exchange: what indeed my contribution would be
after seeing personally the situation.
So what was my contribution? Well, among other things, my fieldwork
would land me a seat at a table like the one in Vienna. There, I would
distribute my (professional, and thus faithful, sensitive, politically-aware)
rendering of the immediate and complex reality of these youngmen. Through
my representation of their experience, I could introduce a different time and
space into the debate: the spatial context of the individuals and groups
demanding to know what was in it for them, and the immediacy and urgency
with which they demanded that. The process of the debate would then be
about specifying trade-offs and making hard policy choices by balancing
my contextual knowledge with abstract and universal claims. And hopefully
my research subjects would end up being served by aid that was slightly
better targeted to their situation — even though the challenge of linking
armed community security and demand for sewing machines would be a
substantial one for any policy maker or implementer.
However, the process in Vienna — or indeed any attempt to produce
authoritative and policy-relevant knowledge about indeterminate things —
was not about making hard policy choices. Instead, it was about deferring,
bracketing and keeping not just choices but the time and place of choosing
for ourselves. Establishing such power to choose does not undermine an
academic researcher’s ethical justification for participating in such research:
at some point in the future, something good — power, clothes, a sewing
machine — might well ‘feed back’ to respondents.29 Instead, this practice
of deferral raises a different ethical challenge: how experts use the image of
those being represented.
My respondents remained what David Kennedy (1993: 196) calls
‘reader[s] of last resort’ of my research. They were ultimate guarantors of
the validity of my work and the gold reserves behind my academic currency.
And yet they were strangely hypothetical. The more those being researched
— the fourth force in the room — were invoked in Vienna, the more they
‘mystically reced[ed]’ (ibid.) and the further away they seemed. They were
real only at some vague moment of problem recognition in the past and
implementation in the future. They were certainly used as a way of making
concerns immediate. Yet at the same time, their image in all its complexity
could be used to defer action, since we could certainly all agree that context
matters, and thus more contextual research might be needed.
This fourth force thus functioned as a placeholder for our future engage-
ment with them. Their information bought me a place at the table. The
29. The materiality of this type of ‘feedback’ distinguishes it from ideas of bringing ‘research’
back to those being researched — meaning a researcher presents the narratives or research
findings she has generated to those being narrated. Presenting research findings in this way
expresses a concernwith the ethics and transparency of storytelling as a process and practice,
rather than with research as an instrument to generate subsequent action, as discussed here.
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discussions around the table produced the possibility of implementation and
control over resources, and implementation held out the promise of a good
and reasonable outcome for the South Sudanese. The three forces in the
room, as a side effect, were protected from criticism by referring to the
fourth force in South Sudan and elsewhere. Those who might directly expe-
rience and perhaps condemn the effects of consultations in Vienna had thus
become part of the consultations’ fabric. As Harry Lime says to Holly Mar-
tins, when Holly realizes he has been woven into Harry’s greater shadowy
game, ‘I’d like to cut you in, you know. We always did things together . . .
I’ve no one left in Vienna I can really trust’ (Greene and Reed, 1969: 99).
CONCLUSION: ‘OF COURSE, A SITUATION LIKE THAT DOES TEMPT
AMATEURS’30
Harry Lime sells adulterated penicillin, but shrugs off any concerns about the
human cost. ‘Nobody thinks in terms of human beings’, he says. ‘Govern-
ments don’t, so why should we? They talk of the people and the proletariat,
and I talk of the mugs. It’s the same thing. They have their five year plans
and so have I’ (Greene and Reed, 1969: 98). As long as there are places
like post-war Vienna where the boundaries between occupying forces allow
Harry Lime to disappear into another sector to evade responsibility for his
actions, place and time do not matter.
Where does this leave us? First, our experience highlights how limited
our understanding is about where and how political contestation and critical
intervention in global knowledge practices might take place. Academics
usually imagine their own sites behind tall walls of ivory, demarcating
a critical outside to which they can retreat, however unstable they might
recognize those walls to be (Lewis and Mosse, 2006b; Riles, 2006; Shore
et al., 2011). From that vantage point, they assume that engagement can
be strategized. Yet our experience shows that for battles over the content
of concepts such as security and justice, those outside spaces actually sit
squarely on the field of battle, with doors open to all. We thus suggest
that we need to retool in order to produce ethical critiques that allocate
responsibility by situating experts in a series of policy decisions (or non-
decisions). Otherwise, existing political critiques will fall short of the mark.
Existing critiques ask questions like ‘Is the division of labour right? Who
wins and loses from it? Are the actors fulfilling their roles?’. Yet these cri-
tiques rest on working within and through fictional groups like ‘academics’
and ‘policymakers’. Allocating responsibilities to these fictional groups fails
to hold real actors to account. A straightforward turn to studying practice
to develop such critiques is insufficient: the study of practice too often falls
into a dramaturgy of these roles.
30. Greene and Reed (1969: 12).
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Our story of efforts to generate global governance through indeterminate
concepts suggests another way of thinking about expert roles and responsi-
bilities in global governance.Wemust develop tools that are at the same time
individually reflective and sensitive to institutional politics. For academics,
this means linking the details of an individual academic’s participation in
knowledge production to the political question of the broader role of the
academy as an institutional participant in the fragmented world of global
governance — and determining under what circumstances the two are con-
tradictory or mutually supportive.
Does the fluidity of roles and responsibilities necessarily lead to processes
and outcomes that are as relentlessly self-interested, casuistic and ethically
superficial as Harry Lime? Quite the contrary. All of us sat around the
table in Vienna were skilled at marshalling and repurposing different sets
of arguments and logics. We were equally adept at turning people into
images to produce the to-be-populated space of implementation. Yet we
believe that the figure of the slippery expert can be ethically productive,
rather than incorrigibly Lime-ish. The slippery expert places the many future
decisions that go into implementation into the limelight, rather than keeping
them in the shade off-stage. Emphasizing contradictions rather than drawing
clear boundaries also reminds us that indicators can take on a life of their
own (Riles, 2006). They offer the potential for anyone to convert deferral
into decision at any moment, as histories of other types of bureaucratic
documentation and knowledge production suggest (Mosse, 2004; Olivier de
Sardan, 2009; Seidman, 1982; Wade, 1996).
Both an ethical critique and a potential repurposing of knowledge pro-
duction in global governance must be predicated on an applied theory of
the same. This theory must seek to understand the politics of instantiation
and determination along the chains of governance produced from the global
to the local, taking in the different types of actors in between. This will be
of ever-more importance as the SDG-inspired ‘data revolution’ in aid leads
to many more such consultations and intensifies and metastasizes knowl-
edge practices.31 What will happen to moments of decision when we have
multiple and overlapping fictional spaces of implementation? What differ-
ent techniques and images of the governed might be used to produce these
spaces and keep them open? As a result, how will these spaces relate to each
other, and be governed?
The Third Man ends after Harry Lime’s death. Yet there is no redemption.
Holly Martins is hardly freed by having killed his best friend. The victims
of Harry’s crimes go unmentioned and many relationships are destroyed.
The work of getting closure, for Martins and the rest of the world, has
only just begun. One of the last things Martins says of Vienna is: ‘I can’t
just leave’ (Greene and Reed, 1969: 120). Vienna can be anywhere and
31. For a summary, see www.undatarevolution.org/ (last accessed 5 November 2015).
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everywhere — an indeterminate time and place of fractured governance that
we produce, populate and fromwhich we extract what we need. As for Holly
Martins, so for us: Vienna will be present whenever and wherever we go,
and just like Harry Lime, we made it so.
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